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The  UK  is moving  into  a  new  phase  of  energy  governance  which
is characterised  by signiﬁcant  demand  for  new  investment  to
meet  long  term  climate  policy  objectives  and  to  address  shorter
term  energy  security  challenges.  This  paper  examines  how  con-
tributions  from  the  socio-technical  systems  approach  can  be
operationalised  to  address  the  policy  and  societal  challenge  of  large
scale  investments  in  low  carbon  energy  infrastructure.  Research
on  socio-technical  transitions  explores  the  dynamics  of  long  term
structural  change  in  capital  intensive  systems  such  as  energy,  hous-
ing  and  water  supply,  seeking  to  redirect  them  towards  more
sustainable  long term  trajectories.  Focusing  on  the UK  electric-
ity generation  sector,  the  paper  expands  on three  key  low  carbon
investment  challenges  where  socio-technical  research  can  provide
useful  insights  – (1)  understanding  long  term  uncertainty  and
investment  risks;  (2) avoiding  technological  lock-in;  and  (3)  accel-
erating  the  diffusion  of low  carbon  ﬁnance  ‘niches’.
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1. Introduction
In order for low carbon energy transitions to be realised large scale and long term capital investment
will be required in a range of new infrastructure assets. Infrastructure, in a general sense, refers to the
material basis of socio-technical systems – power stations, rail networks, ports, airports, pipes and
wires etc. This has always been an important public policy issue because infrastructure supports the
delivery of essential societal services, such as power for electrical devices and mobility. Governments
have historically played a central role in infrastructure investment because of the wider social and
economic beneﬁts that it brings, but also because securing investment in these assets requires a long
term and consistent governance framework. The balance between public and private investment has
varied, though, between different types of infrastructure and according to the relative dominance of
different political views of the role of markets in economic decision-making.
A strongly market-oriented framework for energy infrastructure investment has been followed in
the UK since the early 1990s, with this model increasingly being followed in other countries. This
reﬂects a view that markets for the delivery of societal services would bring about the incentives for
private actors to invest in infrastructure assets, leading to greater economic efﬁciency and socially
optimal outcomes. This model was strongly inﬂuenced by neo-classical economic thinking (Helm,
2003). However, this framework is increasingly challenged by the need for high levels of investment
to meet other societal objectives of reducing carbon emissions and maintaining energy security, whilst
maintaining affordability of energy services to consumers and businesses. In order to deal with these
new complexities it is likely that a rebalancing of the relationship between governments and markets
will be required (Pearson and Foxon, 2012). The energy policy framework which emerges will need to
address a number of key questions: What kinds of policies can effectively mobilise ﬁnance and deliver
low carbon forms of infrastructure investment? How is uncertainty and investment risk managed by
public and private actors? And how are long and short term policy objectives reconciled?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which studies of socio-technical systems and
their long term dynamics can provide useful insights which help to address these complex questions.
The origins of the ﬁeld can be traced back to the work of the historian of technology Thomas Hughes
who charted the early emergence and expansion of ‘large technical systems’ (LTS) such as electricity
supply (Hughes, 1983). Hughes and colleagues highlighted the role of pioneer ‘system builders’ such
as Thomas Edison, and how, over time, these infrastructures develop a systemic character through
a process of mutual shaping of the technical system and its wider social environment (Summerton,
1994; Coutard, 1999; Vleuten, 2004). More recent contributions have sought to account for the trans-
formation of these now mature systems in the context of climate change, energy security and other
drivers of change (Magnusson, 2012; Foxon, 2013).
Both the historically orientated LTS approach and the transitions perspective are grounded in the
wider ﬁeld of technology studies which seeks to account for the social character and implications of
technical change (Williams and Edge, 1996; Bolton and Foxon, 2014; Mackenzie and Wacjman, 1999).
Unlike neo-classical economics, which has formed the intellectual basis for energy policy in the UK
since the 1980s, strands of technology studies such as this view technical change as a dynamic non-
linear process, where outcomes are not determined by markets, but shaped by a wider set of social
processes. A systems framing is adopted in which the market is embedded in socio-technical ‘regimes’
which are alignments of institutions, infrastructures and actors which provide stability to and underpin
the delivery of essential societal services. Central to the analysis is how fundamental and long term
changes to regimes occur, focusing on the de-stabling effects of radical innovations which emerge from
typically dispersed ‘niche’ spaces, and changes in wider socio-technical ‘landscapes’, including macro
level social, economic and technological trends (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002b). Our purpose is
not to undertake a systematic review of the entire body of socio-technical systems literature (For
overviews see: Markard et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2010; van den Bergh et al., 2011; Vleuten, 2004),
rather we draw selectively from key concepts and contributions to the ﬁeld to consider speciﬁc areas
where we believe socio-technical thinking can help to contribute to the low carbon investment debate.
Although questions of ﬁnance and investment have not been an explicit focus of this ﬁeld of research
to date, though see (Geels, 2013), there has been some engagement with the issue, for example with a
recent special issue of this journal focusing on the implications of the economic-ﬁnancial crisis for the
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prospects of transitions to more environmentally sustainable systems (van den Bergh, 2013). While
this has been highly relevant to the potential effects of changes at a macro or ‘landscape’ level (Antal
and van den Bergh, 2013; Loorbach and Lijnis Huffenreuter, 2013), there is a need to understand in
more depth how institutional realignments and policy changes inﬂuence infrastructure investments
in speciﬁc contexts and in relation to individual socio-technical ‘regimes’ e.g. the electricity genera-
tion and supply regime. Through a number of illustrative examples the paper highlights how a more
nuanced understanding of the complex interrelationships between long term technical change and
social contexts, and the non-linear dynamics of innovation processes implicit in socio-technical studies
can usefully inform policy debates in relation to low carbon investments.
The main empirical focus of the paper is on the UK electricity generation sector. The need to provide
adequate and appropriate forms of public ﬁnancial support to incentivise high levels of private invest-
ment in power generation is currently framing the design of one of the main UK low carbon policies
– Electricity Market Reform. Section 2 outlines the speciﬁc policy issues being debated in the UK. In
Section 3, we expand upon three areas in which socio-technical studies can contribute to an analysis of
low carbon investment in this sector: (1) framing and understanding uncertainty and investment risks
through the articulation of transition pathways, (2) emphasising long term time horizons and avoiding
technological lock-in, and (3) accelerating the diffusion of low carbon ﬁnance ‘niches’. In Section 4 we
reﬂect on the contribution of socio-technical research to addressing the low carbon investment policy
challenges and the limits of the approach. We  highlight that the nature of the contribution is in pro-
viding systemic frameworks based on an understanding of the long term dynamics of infrastructure
change, rather than instrumental and speciﬁc policy recommendations. We  also note that high level
systemic frameworks such as this do not provide in-depth insights into the political negotiation of
different policy priorities and trade-offs being made. In the ﬁnal section we draw key conclusions.
2. The UK electricity sector – background and investment challenges
We  begin in this section by brieﬂy outlining key aspects of the policy background to electricity
sector transformation and low carbon investment in the UK. The UK, like many other industrialised
nations, is currently facing the prospect of radical decarbonisation of its energy supply systems. The
2008 Climate Change Act set a legally binding goal of reducing the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions by
80% by 2050, from 1990 levels, with intermediate carbon budgets to be set towards this goal, based
on recommendations of an independent Committee of Climate Change (CCC). In its Fourth Carbon
Budget report, the Committee (CCC, 2010) recommended that the UK should aim for a reduction in
the carbon intensity of electricity generation from its current level of approximately 500 gCO2/kWh to
around 50 gCO2/kWh by 2030, as a key element of reducing the UK’s carbon emissions to this time.1
Particular emphasis has been placed on the electricity sector, because relative to other energy intensive
areas of socio-economic activity, it is seen as likely to be cheaper and more feasible to decarbonise
electricity supply ﬁrst due to the availability of alternatives (i.e. a range of renewables and nuclear
power). Electricity generated from low carbon sources could then increasingly be used to meet other
energy service needs for heating and transport.2
Fig. 1 below provides some background by showing the large coal, nuclear, combined cycle gas
turbine (CCGT) generation plants and wind farms currently operating in the UK and the year they
came onto the system. As can be seen, the vast majority of operating coal plants were constructed in
the late 1960s/early 1970s and most of the UK’s existing nuclear investments took place during the
1970s and 80s when the system was operated by a state owned body, the Central Electricity Generating
Board (CEGB).
Much of the investment made by private companies following privatisation and liberalisation
reforms in the 1990s has been in lower capital cost and ﬂexible CCGT (gas) plant. Despite the new
1 In 2011, the UK Parliament accepted the Committee’s recommendation for overall carbon emissions reductions for the
period 2023–2027, but did not agree to set a speciﬁc reduction target for carbon intensity of electricity generation.
2 It should be noted that this view of an ‘all-electric future’ is not universally accepted. Some argue that there is too much
emphasis on electriﬁcation, at the expense of potentially more effective means of decarbonisation of the heat and transport.
For  heat see: (Speirs et al., 2010).
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Fig. 1. Cumulative installed capacity (GW) of major power stations currently operating in the UK, with dates of installation
(DECC, 2012a: data from Table 5.11). (In the interests of clarity this ﬁgure does not include non CCGT gas-ﬁred generation,
oil  and diesel-ﬁred generation, small scale solar and CHP, along with and other renewables such as hydro and biomass. Total
generating capacity connected to the UK transmission network in 2012 was in the region of 90 GW.)
investments in CCGTs and wind farms which have taken place over the past number of decades, the
UK faces a potential ‘generation gap’ as many of the existing coal and nuclear plant shown in the ﬁgure
will come off the system over the coming decade due to ageing plant and a lack of compliance with
environmental legislation (DECC, 2012b).3 This has led to concerns over a short term threat to energy
security due to a reduction in the level of spare capacity on the system – the capacity margin. The
UK energy market regulator has recently estimated that the capacity margin could fall to about 4% by
2015, from current levels of 14% (OFGEM, 2012).
It is only since the introduction of a tradable obligation certiﬁcate programme, the Renewables
Obligation (RO), in the early 2000s that signiﬁcant levels of investment have taken place in renew-
able generation, primarily onshore wind farms. A notable feature of the UK approach has been the
embedding of low carbon technology policy, such as the RO, in the day-to-day operation of energy
markets. Broadly, this has meant that government is reluctant to interfere in the day-to-day operation
of markets and inﬂuence the price levels for renewable output, rather it has set the quantity of low
carbon generation (e.g. number of Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcates), and the price for this would be
set by the market.
A key underpinning of the ‘hands off’ relationship which emerged since the 1980s between govern-
ment and the industry has been basic assumptions of neo-classical economic theory (Mitchell, 2008)
– that investment is most efﬁciently made by private actors on the basis of price signals mediated
through the energy markets. The main aim of this approach has been to utilise market based incen-
tives to improve the efﬁciency of the previously state owned energy industries, and the focus of policy
has been on short rather than long term objectives – to reduce the day-to-day operational costs of
generating and distributing energy to end users. On these terms the UK programme of privatisation
and liberalisation can perhaps be regarded as a success (Pollitt, 2008), however, the UK is moving
3 The Large Combustion Plant Directive requires large electricity generators to meet more stringent air quality standards as
of  January 2008. In many cases it will be too expensive for coal and oil plants to meet these standards and will therefore need
to  ‘opt out’ which means that they have to close by the end of 2015 or upon reaching 20,000 h of operation after 2008. DECC
note that ‘By the end of 2015. . .around 8 GW of coal-ﬁred power generation capacity closes due to the Large Combustion Plant
Directive’. In the medium/longer term there is uncertainty as to what effect the EU’s Industrial Emissions Directive will have
on  coal plant closures. All but one of the UK’s nuclear ﬂeet is due to close by 2023, with Sizewell B expected to close in 2035.
There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the exact timing of plant closures, in the case of Nuclear plant life extensions have been
granted in the past, and in the case of coal plant market factors such as the carbon price and international coal prices inﬂuence
plant economics and therefore their running hours.
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into a new phase of energy governance where new investment to meet long term climate policy and
energy security objectives is the main priority.
A recently published UK Energy Research Centre working paper containing provisional results of a
study on ﬁnancing the low carbon transition has sought to account for the investment costs of replacing
this capacity and meeting climate change targets in the UK context (Blyth et al., 2014). Following a
review of previously published estimates Blyth et al. note that “Across all the scenarios assessed in this
study, the average amount of new capacity needing to be added to the system was  3.4 GW each year
up to 2020”, and in terms of investment, “Estimates of the size of the investment challenge range from
the often quoted DECC/OFGEM4 ﬁgure of £110 bn by 2020 (including transmission and generation) to
much higher ﬁgures ranging from £200 bn to over £300 bn by 2030 from organisations such as National
Grid, the Committee on Climate Change and London School of Economics” (p. iii). They highlight that
“These ﬁgures are considerably higher than the build rate during the 2000s which averaged 1.2 GW
capacity added per year, with CAPEX of £1.1 bn per year” (p.iii).
Before its end of term in 2010 the then Labour government came to the conclusion that the current
electricity market framework and associated support mechanisms, including the RO, did not provide
sufﬁcient incentive for private energy companies to invest in the levels of low carbon power generation
needed to meet UK and EU renewable energy and carbon reduction targets. The deﬁciencies of the
current market arrangement in relation to new low carbon investment was  central to it setting in train
an Electricity Market Reform (EMR) process, which was taken up by the new coalition government
and is embodied in measures in the 2012 Finance Act (rising carbon ﬂoor price for power generation)
and the 2013 Energy Act (contract for difference feed-in tariffs (CfD FITs), capacity mechanism and
emissions performance standard). The likely success of these measures in stimulating high levels
of investment in low carbon generation has been the subject of much debate, with some observers
arguing that the EMR  process was largely driven by the need to provide an incentive framework to
support the building of new nuclear power stations5 (Toke, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2011).
The proposed CfD FIT model introduces long term contracts for low carbon generation (renewables,
nuclear and CCS) whereby a ‘strike price’ will be predetermined for each of the qualifying technologies,
and generators will be remunerated if the market price is below this level. A key difference with the
previous approach is that price will not be solely an outcome of market operation, but to a large
extent determined by government decision. This is clearly a deviation from neo-classical economic
principles which is characterised by increasing government intervention in the energy market. It now
seems that the UK government is reluctant to let prices rise to a level required for new low carbon
investment because of concerns over the impact on the affordability of energy to consumers. Instead,
it is seeking to intervene in the market to spread out the costs of investment over a longer timescale
and to socialise elements of investment risk, which it is hoped will reduce the cost of borrowing for
private investors. A key argument of this paper is that government needs to do more than help private
investors realise a return on large scale low carbon investments by socialising risk, if it is to achieve its
carbon reduction targets. There may  be potential to utilise this window of opportunity to rethink the
basis on which energy policy is made and implement a more long term orientated approach which is
based on an assessment of options and innovation outcomes, rather than like-for-like replacement of
the current system.
3. Speciﬁc insights from socio-technical studies on low carbon investment in the UK power
sector
The purpose of this main body of the paper is to discuss ways in which insights from socio-technical
studies can be deployed with a view towards contributing to a new energy policy framework which
is better equipped to address the challenges of low carbon investment and long term transformation.
4 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM).
5 On 21 October 2013, the UK Government announced an agreement with French energy company EDF and its Chinese
energy company partners to provide support for the building of a new 2 reactor 3.2 GW nuclear power station at Hinkley
Point in South-West England, guaranteeing an index-linked price of at least £89.50 for each MWh  generated for 35 years,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hinkley-point-c.
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The analysis is informed by two sources: the main source is work conducted as part of the ‘Transition
Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy’ research consortium which both authors have been involved with
(Foxon, 2013; Foxon et al., 2010). The interdisciplinary consortium, comprising engineers, economists
and social scientists, has been developing and analysing alternative socio-technical scenarios, or path-
ways, for the UK to achieve its 2050 climate targets. In constructing these alternative futures, the
consortium has drawn upon socio-technical insights to develop more robust methodologies for the
analysis of the long term scenarios in energy systems. In Section 3.1 below, we argue that this approach
can help to better frame uncertainty in energy transitions and to characterise associated investment
risks.
Our second source is a qualitative analysis of key policy documents relating to UK government’s
approach to addressing the issue of power sector investment and a series of semi-structured interviews
with actors in the energy/infrastructure investment chain; focusing on large institutional investors,
investment managers, community scale investors, industry bodies and NGOs. To date 15 interviews
have been conducted as part of a scoping study designed to develop a more in-depth understanding
of the evolving relationship between energy policy and the investment community. A list of those
interviewed is contained in an appendix at the end of this article. The interviews mostly provided
background information to inform the main arguments in this paper. Our discussion in Section 3.3
of alternative investment models draws primarily from our interviews with individuals who have
knowledge of the institutional investment community (primarily interviews: 1, 5, 6, and 9), and three
individuals who are involved in the ﬁnancing of small scale renewables (interviews: 3, 7 and 10).
Subsequent publications will draw more speciﬁcally on the insights from these interviews.
The sections below draw from an initial analysis of this material and the work of the Transition
Pathways project where we identify a number of challenges to be confronted by policy makers in
relation to low carbon investment, highlighting key contributions from socio-technical thinking.
3.1. Exploring uncertainty through coevolutionary pathways
As outlined in Section 2 there is a great degree of uncertainty and debate regarding the optimal
technical conﬁguration and investment cost of decarbonising the UK electricity grid, particularly in
the medium and long term. A recently published report from the UK Energy Research Centre has
begun to identify the range of political, economic and technological uncertainties which could slow
down or potentially derail the UK’s low carbon transition (Watson et al., 2014). Key uncertainties are
technological (relating to technology costs and system integration of renewables), economic (ﬁnancial
issues discussed above), natural resource availability, and political (what choices are made and by
whom, public attitudes to different technology options) in their character. An understanding of the
nature and origins of such uncertainty is of course critical in the context of investment in capital
intensive assets where returns over the long duration of the investment need to be protected against
uncertainty.
In his history of ‘Great Transformations’ throughout the twentieth century, Blyth (2002) argues
that structural change and economic crises are characterised by periods of “Knightian” uncertainty
i.e. ‘situations in which agents cannot anticipate the outcome of a decision and cannot assign prob-
abilities to the outcome’ (Beckert, 1996). Under these circumstances conventional approaches to
evaluating investment risk, for example based on ﬁnancial appraisal methodologies which rely on
an identiﬁcation and measurement of risks, become problematic.
Structural uncertainties at a system level which are inﬂuenced by policy and regulatory regimes
tend to be poorly understood, one of the implications being that wider social risks and distributional
effects are often poorly accounted for. There is therefore a need to think about uncertainties in an
integrated and systemic way. In the past, scenario planning has been relied upon to explore the range
of uncertainties inﬂuencing energy systems, particularly in the wake of the 1970s oil crises. However a
recent review of low carbon scenarios, which are often based on conventional scenario methodologies,
conducted by Hughes and Strachan (2010), identiﬁed a number of shortcomings of such approaches;
primarily an “over-reliance on constructs, notably exogenous emissions constraints and high level
trends, which diminish the ability to understand how the various future scenarios could be brought
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about or avoided” (Hughes and Strachan (2010: p.6065). Geels diagnoses two failures of traditional
scenario methodologies (Geels, 2002a):
1. ‘an implicit linear model of technological development’
2. ‘undue emphasis on macro-logic and neglect of meso-logic’
A number of recent contributions to socio-technical studies have begun to develop new method-
ologies for scenario construction which are grounded in an appreciation of the interconnectedness
of the social and technical and how future pathways of change are shaped by their coevolution. The
method of socio-technical scenarios developed in the ﬁeld has been deployed to examine how social
and technical factors coevolve to shape alternative pathways of long term system change (Hofman
and Elzen, 2010; Hofman et al., 2004). Geels (2002a) argues that the method ‘can be particularly useful
in ‘ﬂuid’ and ‘hot’ situations, i.e. when the dominance of existing technologies is challenged by newly
emerging technologies’ (p.361). He goes on to argue that there is a need to think about scenarios in
a multi-level way, incorporating the macro trends with an understanding of meso, or industry level,
processes and speciﬁc micro level actor dynamics.
This methodology has been deployed in a number of studies to develop insights for long term
energy innovation policy (Verbong and Geels, 2008; Foxon, 2013; Shackley and Green, 2007). These
studies argue that the approach can contribute to a more realistic account of how the energy system
might change over time. Drawing from the wider socio-technical literature, these types of scenarios
take into account a number of complex processes and mechanisms including:
• Co-evolutionary processes – new interactions of technologies, institutions, business strategies,
ecosystems and end user practices (Foxon, 2011).
• Multi-level interactions – how spaces of socio-technical reproduction (regimes) and transforma-
tion (niches) coexist and interact within a system, and are inﬂuenced by a wider system context
(landscape) (Geels and Schot, 2007).
• Actor dynamics – the role and relative inﬂuence of different market, government and civil society
actors in shaping technical change (Foxon, 2013).
These types of pathways could be used to explore investment uncertainty in a more structured
and coherent way and how low carbon technology options might be constrained or enabled by wider
governance and systemic factors.
3.1.1. Illustration of pathways from the Transition Pathways project
Taking these multi-actor/multi-level socio-technical processes as a basis for constructing alterna-
tive low carbon energy scenarios has been a central aim of the Transition Pathways project. A recent
contribution by one of the authors (Foxon, 2013) draws on this methodology to develop and analyse
three ‘transition pathways’ for the UK electricity system out to 2050. The pathways were constructed
through an iterative process, starting with a dialogue between the consortium members, incorporat-
ing insights from sociology, economics and engineering, and subsequently a number of stakeholder
workshops were held in an effort to bring in expertise from industry actors and policy makers. The
ﬁnal stages of pathway construction involved an assessment of the technical feasibility of the scenarios
(for a fuller technical assessment of the pathways see: Foxon, 2013, Barton et al., 2013).
The three pathways speciﬁc to the UK context which emerged are based on how different actor
framings of a low carbon future, or governance ‘logics’, which represent alternative policy and regu-
latory contexts, might inﬂuence and shape key multi-level and co-evolutionary processes:
• A ‘market rules’ pathway (Fig. 2a) where a liberalised market framework prevails in which large
energy utilities are the dominant investors. The key policy mechanism is a carbon price and private
actors make their investment decisions based on this constraint;
• A ‘Central coordination’ pathway (Fig. 2b) where national government exerts a strong inﬂuence over
the energy system in order to deal with the ‘trilemma’ of addressing energy security, rising costs
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Fig. 2. (a)–(c) Investment pathways for the UK power sector. Data from the Transitions Pathways Project.
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and achieving emissions reduction targets. Government intervention is characterised by the setting
up of a Strategic Energy Agency;
• A ‘thousand ﬂowers’ pathway (Fig. 2c) which sees a more decentralised future as non-traditional
investors in the energy system, such as cooperatives and local authorities, play a leading role in
investing in low carbon technologies and energy efﬁciency programmes.
Each of the pathways involve different mixes of low carbon generation (nuclear, carbon capture
and storage and renewables) which diffuse as old coal and nuclear plants close (cf. Fig. 1) and CCGT is
increasingly used as peaking plant rather than for base load. The graphs above, which are based on a
quantitative assessment of the pathway narratives summarised previously, illustrate the diffusion of
selected key low carbon technologies in each of the pathways.
In the central coordination pathway (Fig. 2a), a ‘technology push’ approach sees a focus on large
scale centralised technologies such as nuclear, CCS and offshore wind. Market rules also sees a broadly
centralised electricity system but with less reliance on nuclear power due to the lack of govern-
ment backed long term contracts. Thousand ﬂowers on the other hand sees a signiﬁcant role for local
and decentralised technologies such as CHP with district heating and small scale microgeneration
technologies.
Largely due to the increasing electriﬁcation of heat and transport, meeting the 2050 decarbonisation
target will necessitate a signiﬁcant increase in installed capacity in 2050 (Central Coordination – 140.5
GW,  Market Rules – 173.7 GW,  Thousand Flowers – 148.5 GW,  compared to the current UK generating
capacity of 90 GW). This highlights the scale of the investment challenge to be faced in the coming
decades in not only replacing existing fossil fuel capacity with low carbon technologies, but also in
enabling the increasing electriﬁcation of heat and transport sectors.
3.1.2. Unpacking investment risk
This approach of exploring radically different socio-technical conﬁgurations could allow actors to
think in a more systemic way about the relationship between risk and uncertainties associated with
alternative governance processes and actor alignments. Thinking in terms of long term integrated
pathways, where a portfolio of technologies, rather than single projects, can be considered at a system
level could also be useful in formulating effective policy measures. Here an important question for
policy makers will be to understand how their decisions regarding the design of regulatory frameworks
for infrastructure investment can inﬂuence and potentially help to manage investment risk.
For large scale infrastructure systems, investment risk can be broken down into early stage
ﬁnancing and construction risks (e.g. planning delays, cost over runs, exchange rate ﬂuctuations),
technical/operational risks (e.g. risk of technical failure, higher than expected maintenance costs) and
market risks (e.g. risk of lower than expected demand). Investors aim to quantify these risks in the
light of future projections, but the risks are ampliﬁed by fundamental uncertainty over which, if any,
low carbon pathway the county will follow. Investment risks therefore need to be understood in the
context of these alternative socio-technical futures.
In the central coordination pathway there is a strong reliance on nuclear technology. Recent expe-
rience with new nuclear builds in Finland and France has highlighted the high risk of cost overruns,
therefore raising the construction risk in this pathway. Similarly construction risk is a concern for
investors in offshore wind farms (PWC, 2010), which is an important technology in the central coor-
dination and market rules pathways. A question for government is therefore whether speciﬁc policies
are required to mitigate this construction risk e.g. by creating a bridging mechanism which spreads
risk between private investors and taxpayers/customers during the early project phase. This will have
implications for the type of policies designed to attract ﬁnance, for example one of our interviewees
noted that “some pension funds could be attracted to invest directly. . . [but] they would struggle with
taking construction risk” (Interview 9).
This form of construction risk is perhaps less a feature of the more distributed thousand ﬂowers
pathway. However, market risk may  become a more signiﬁcant challenge in this pathway. This is
because there is falling demand due to successful energy efﬁciency measures, many competing gen-
erators in the market, and a strong reliance on government subsidies in the form of feed-in tariffs.
These market risks may  lead to boom-bust investment cycles and create instability in the electricity
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sector. Mitigating this risk could necessitate a radically redesigned electricity market structure and a
stronger political commitment to renewable support than has previously been displayed on the part
of government.
3.2. Understanding transition dynamics and the timing of investment decisions
The discussion above highlights the implications of structural uncertainty in how low carbon tran-
sition pathways will evolve, in terms of new technologies, governance arrangements and actor roles.
Operating in the midst of this uncertainty is of course an issue for government in setting long term
regulatory frameworks, and private actors in making commercial investment decisions. This is difﬁcult
because infrastructure investments have long time horizons and in many cases investment decisions
need to be made in the short term to meet immediate policy and economic goals, raising the risk of lock-
in to potentially undesirable long term trajectories. The second area that socio-technical research can
inform policy is how an understanding of path dependency and non-linearity in transition pathways
can help to overcome this lock-in.
The wider technology studies literature on path dependency and lock-in (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985;
Unruh, 2000) argues that technical change is not merely the product of an engineering or economic
rationality, rather ‘timing, strategy and historic circumstance, as much as optimality, determine the
winner’ (Unruh, 2000). Historical studies (David, 1985) and modelling exercises (Arthur, 1989, 1994)
have highlighted how events and decisions made in the early stages of technological diffusion can
be ampliﬁed and have enduring effects as ‘winning’ technologies, or dominant designs, beneﬁt from
positive feedbacks such as economies of scale, learning effects, adaptive expectations, and network
effects as systems expand and become increasingly interconnected. These mechanisms can create
a situation of lock-in, arising from the co-evolution of technologies with their wider institutional
environment, which can in turn condition future decision making and constrain the scope for radical
innovation (Unruh, 2000).
The transitions literature characterises this process of lock-in and path dependency in terms of
socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2004) which are underpinned by strong inter-relationships between
institutions, user practises, business strategies and infrastructures. Viewed through the lens of path
dependency and lock-in, the evolution of regimes can be characterised by a number of distinct phases
(Rotmans et al., 2001; Loorbach, 2007): a predevelopment phase characterised by gradual change and
experimentation, with many competing technologies, a take-off phase with more evidence of structural
changes where mechanisms of lock-in begin to take effect, an acceleration phase where dominant
designs emerge and structural changes become more deeply embedded, and ﬁnally a stabilization
phase where a new system state is reached and emphasis is on optimising the existing regime through
incremental innovations. Of course this framework simpliﬁes a more complex and messy reality where
different phases of transition are not neatly deﬁned and sequential, and the borders between one
phase and the next are impossible to delineate. However, as a theoretical construct, it may  provide a
structured way of thinking through the policy and investment challenge of having to make near term
investment decisions in the midst of uncertainty and which will have long term implications.
The energy transition in the UK is likely in the predevelopment phase or the early stages of the take-
off phase as ambitious decarbonisation and renewable deployment targets have been put in place and
structural changes to the electricity sector are beginning to be implemented. Winskel and Radcliffe
(2014) have characterised the emergence of an ‘accelerated innovation’ imperative in the UK where
the priorities of the energy innovation system is shifting away from diversity and the development of
niche technologies, to achieving cost reductions in large scale technology programmes such as CCS and
offshore wind, in order to achieve climate change targets. During this period the main priority is on the
decarbonisation of the electricity grid, which according to the Committee on Climate Change will need
to occur relatively rapidly by 2030, and following this a decarbonisation of the entire energy system
will need to take place, incorporating the heat and transport sectors. As was  outlined in Section 2, rapid
power grid decarbonisation is seen as a ﬁrst step primarily because there are a number of relatively
mature low carbon options available (wind and nuclear), and in any case the UK will need to replace
a number of its ageing coal, nuclear and gas plants over the coming decade. The technology options
for decarbonising heat and transport are not so apparent and as a result there is much less certainty
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as to how the post-2030 acceleration phase will proceed. Creating a smooth transition from the pre-
development and take-off phase of power sector decarbonisation to the subsequent acceleration phase
where the entire energy system becomes low carbon is therefore key. The priority in the take-off phase
is to develop investment strategies which help to ‘future proof’ the energy system by keeping options
open as much as possible i.e. that do not close down the opportunities for niche innovations to become
more widely diffused in the future. Also, in this phase the new skills, expertise, industrial capacity and
supply chains which will also be required in the acceleration phase, will need to be developed.
Transition studies points to the danger of lock-in to sub-optimal long term pathways if decisions
are made solely based on narrow short term criteria, e.g. the need to plug a gap in electricity generation
capacity or to meet renewable energy targets for 2020, without building the necessary foundations
required for a more fundamental transformation in the medium and long term. For example, a key
argument for a 2030 electricity decarbonisation target is that this would help to stimulate the devel-
opment of a renewables supply chain in the UK (Parr, 2013). A number of our interviewees identiﬁed
the need to develop a UK manufacturing base in renewable technologies, with one interviewee from a
large energy supplier noting that this is an immediate issue in particular for offshore wind: “demand
for offshore wind is so strong that the capability of suppliers to meet that demand are being stretched
to the limit, in some cases beyond the limit. So sometimes the capabilities in the supply chain are
dictating the pace of the development, rather than demand” (Interview 2).
This suggests the need to develop alternative criteria which can help to evaluate investments aside
from narrow short term economic ones. For example there may be certain strategic investments which
help future proof the system for the post 2030 phase and create synergies across the transport, heat
and electricity sectors. Taylor et al. (2013) argue that energy storage technologies ﬁt into this category
as they can help to manage a highly distributed and intermittent low carbon energy system, while
Hawkey et al. (2013) argue for more emphasis on local scale infrastructure investments centred on the
efﬁcient provision of low carbon heat. However under current market structures the revenue streams
to investors in these technologies which promote ﬂexibility and efﬁciency are highly uncertain as
their beneﬁts are not speciﬁc to one particular segment of the market but diffused across the entire
system, and are therefore more difﬁcult to account for under current market arrangements (Bolton
and Foxon, 2011, 2013b, 2014; Taylor et al., 2013). Addressing these deﬁciencies of energy markets and
overcoming barriers to the diffusion of long term strategic investments will likely be key to moving
into the acceleration phase.
3.3. Opening up the investment actor space: thinking beyond incumbents and creating diversity in
low carbon ﬁnance
To date most of the low carbon investment in the electricity sector has been ﬁnanced off the cor-
porate balance sheets of the major utilities – in the UK the ‘big six’ energy utilities dominate the
market. However, some inﬂuential actors within the business and investment community claim that
this incumbent investment model may  be inadequate to deliver the levels of low carbon investment
required (CBI, 2011; PWC, 2010). There are two reasons for this: the ﬁrst is that there is simply not
sufﬁcient ﬁnancial capacity amongst the large utility companies in the UK (and most probably across
Europe) who dominate the energy market to deliver the scale of the investment required under the
timescales imposed by decarbonisation targets through traditional ﬁnancing mechanisms. The sec-
ond is the increasingly challenging business environment that large European utility companies now
operate in where demand growth has stalled due to the economic slowdown. Also, unexpected energy
policy developments have created uncertainty in the wider European energy market and in some cases
has damaged incumbent utility balance sheets, most notably the German policy of accelerated nuclear
shutdown and Spain’s decision to retroactively reduce renewable electricity subsidies. In their 2011
National Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury, 2011) the UK Treasury noted that “the principle sources of
private ﬁnance for the UK’s existing infrastructure pipeline – the balance sheets of utility companies
and commercial banks – may  face growing pressure in the medium and long term” (p.97).
In a recently published report investigating the issue from a UK perspective by Blyth et al. (2014)
it was noted that: “Traditional utility companies have recently faced difﬁcult market conditions, with
signiﬁcant demand destruction across Europe as a result of the recession, leading to excess capacity and
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low margins. In the 2000s, utilities took on much higher debt levels to fund mergers and acquisitions
across Europe. Energy companies are now attempting to de-leverage their balance sheets in order to
maintain reasonable credit ratings and access to the low-cost bonds and shares on which their business
model depends. This constrains their ability to raise debt to cover increased investment” (p.iv).
Emphasising this dilemma, an interviewee from one of the large UK utilities stated that “we’ve all
suffered with the last few years, everyone’s balance sheets have suffered and nobody. . .is in a position
to massively ﬁnance new programmes. . .This is a massive unparalleled level of investment. I think
that that is a very very tricky situation to work though” (Interview 13). Blyth et al. (2014) highlight
that the real challenge may  come in the UK in the post-2020 period where, in order to meet ambitious
decarbonisation goals under the fourth and subsequent carbon budgets, a rapid scale up of low carbon
ﬁnance will be required and there may  be a need to diversify the sources of low carbon ﬁnance.
3.3.1. Can government foster low carbon ﬁnance ‘niches’?
Historical studies of previous phases of structural change have highlighted the role of government in
aligning capital ﬂows with long term innovation processes. The work of Carlota Perez for example has
emphasised that the issue of redirecting ﬁnancial capital to more productive ends has been a recurrent
feature of the capitalist system following ﬁnancial and economic crises. Once realignment between
technology and ﬁnance is achieved, Perez argues, there is potential for a ‘golden age’ where ﬁnancial
capital supports the development of productive technological systems, enabling in the past signiﬁcant
investment programmes in infrastructures such as canals, railways, and telecommunications (Perez,
2002, 2013). However, because low carbon investment will need to be policy driven rather than by
beneﬁts to private investors, as has historically been the case (Pearson and Foxon, 2012; Perez, 2013),
signiﬁcant uncertainties remain as to how large scale investment which contributes to the societal
goal of reducing carbon emissions can be brought about. In line with socio-technical studies, there may
be a role for government intervention to facilitate and grow new and innovative forms of ﬁnance. The
transitions approach emphasises the need to develop and foster ‘niche’ spaces or incubation rooms
for radical innovation which, although may  be underdeveloped and uncompetitive against incumbent
technologies, have the potential to diffuse and alter mainstream regimes further down the line (Raven,
2005; Coenen et al., 2010). These arguments may  be equally as applicable to the ways in which low
carbon infrastructure is ﬁnanced, as to the technological innovations themselves.
Of course, large energy companies will continue to play an important role, particularly in delivering
large renewables, CCS and nuclear as they have signiﬁcant knowledge and expertise in developing
large and complex infrastructure projects. However, increasingly attention is being drawn towards
alternative sources of ﬁnance. Below we outline four potential low carbon ﬁnance ‘niches’ which have
been identiﬁed through our discussions with interviewees:
• Energy cooperatives are perhaps the most established form of alternative energy ﬁnancing, dating
back to the early development of wind energy in Denmark. This is primarily an equity based approach
where ownership is conﬁned to members who  hold shares in the cooperative, the principle being
that those who beneﬁt from the cooperative control it. In the UK, cooperatives have tended to be
community based investment in small scale wind farms, and in recent years, following the intro-
duction of dedicated feed-in tariffs for microgeneration, they have supported the building of small
and medium scale solar installations.
• Energy service companies (ESCos), unlike incumbent utilities base their business model on the pro-
vision of energy services in the most efﬁcient way  possible, and in some cases use the projected
returns from efﬁciency savings to ﬁnance new investments. A UK based ESCo, Thamesway Energy,
which is wholly owned by Woking borough council, partly ﬁnanced investments in CHP plants and
district heating infrastructure by savings from energy efﬁciency measures. Private companies also
operate in this space by providing energy performance contracting to customers, meaning that cus-
tomers can install technologies such as domestic microgeneration at little or no upfront capital cost
(Hannon et al., 2013).
• Forms of investment disintermediation where ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and investment
funds are bypassed in the investment process have gained increasing attention following the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. There is one example in the UK of such activity in the renewable energy sector; Abundance
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Generation,6 who are attempting to directly link individual retail investors with project developers.
In this case the developer retains ownership of the scheme but issues debt debentures to raise
ﬁnance, which are not listed on a stock exchange but sold to individuals who can subsequently sell
them on.
• The ﬁnal ﬁnancing niche we point to are new ways of engaging institutional investors. The question of
how to engage with and attract institutional investors, primarily pension and insurance funds, into
the low carbon sector has become an increasingly central part of mainstream energy policy debates in
the UK, and there has been much discussion surrounding the potential role that innovative ﬁnancing
mechanisms such as green infrastructure bonds could play in this. These types of investor who hold
large pools of capital would not traditionally have invested in the electricity generation sector.
However, the long term nature and potential for predictable returns which are protected against
inﬂation are attractive for these investors, particularly for maturing pension funds. As discussed
previously, it will be critical to allocate investment risk between private investors, customers and
taxpayers in an equitable manner and to engender greater conﬁdence in the long term prospects
for low carbon investments. Blyth et al. (2014) note: “there does seem to be a growing appetite
amongst institutional investors to put more money into infrastructure funds, and some estimates
suggest that the amount of money available could increase by a factor of 2 or 3 (up to $6.5 tn)” (p.vii).
The literature on niches for sustainable innovation highlights three key areas of niche governance
that require attention (Smith et al., 2014; Smith and Raven, 2012): the ﬁrst is niche shielding where
radical innovations are protected from the prevailing market or ‘selection environment’, e.g. through
subsidies, the second is nurturing where the development and growth of innovations is enabled, and
the third is empowering where niches begin to interact with and inﬂuence the incumbent regime. These
aspects of governing niche innovation will have different implications for the examples outlined above.
For example, energy cooperatives where shareholders retain direct control are likely to be limited in
the size of projects they can develop and will rely strongly on forms of government subsidy for small
scale decentralised technologies such as feed-in tariffs for their long term survival. On the other hand,
approaches which engage with institutional investors and the wider capital markets are potentially
more scalable and closely aligned with the incumbent regime rules and technologies. In this case, the
focus of policy should be on short term intervention, playing a catalytic role and increasing investor
conﬁdence, with the expectation that the niche will rapidly become self-sustaining.
In 2012 the UK Government initiated a Green Investment Bank, a public organisation to stimulate
investment in the low carbon sector. A more in-depth review is required to explore the extent to
which such public lending institutions can accelerate the scaling up and diffusion of different forms of
non-traditional ownership and ﬁnancing, and the ways in which policy can protect and nurture these
niches in appropriate ways, encouraging new forms of learning in this area.
4. Discussion and reﬂection on policy contributions
In this section we reﬂect on the nature of the contribution that socio-technical systems analysis
can make it in providing an overarching framework for the development of energy policy in relation
to low carbon investment.
Recent analyses of energy policy and politics in the UK have suggested that economic theories and
methods have been extremely inﬂuential in formulating and structuring the market based paradigm
of energy governance in the UK since the 1980s (Kern et al., 2013). In this sense economic theory has
played a performative role (Mackenzie et al., 2007; Callon, 1998), not only has it sought to under-
stand the structure and functioning of energy markets, it has played an important role in initially
designing them and bringing them into being. It seems increasingly clear however that this eco-
nomics based model is incapable of delivering the type of low carbon investment required over the
necessary timescales, and that government needs to step in to redirect and channel ﬁnance into the
sector. Considering the inﬂuential role that neo-classical economics played in bringing into being the
6 https://www.abundancegeneration.com/about/.
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last radical socio-technical shift in UK energy – privatisation and liberalisation – it may  be the case
that there is scope for a new and renewed dialogue between academic discourse and policy.
In reﬂecting on the contributions from socio-technical systems studies outlined, the strength of
the approach may  be in providing overarching frameworks based on a systems understanding, rather
than guidelines on speciﬁc short interventions. The nature of this type of relationship between tech-
nology studies and policy has been outlined by Russell and Williams (2002) who  argue that the ﬁeld
‘can make a signiﬁcant contribution to the current rethinking of approaches to technology policy: in
general through a reconceptualising of its key problems and concerns, and speciﬁcally formulating or
improving particular forms of policy analysis and practice’ (p.146). Russell and Williams argue that this
new form of policy informed by technology studies will be different in that it ‘does not feed into policy-
making in a single and simple way. . .It is highly unlikely that its use will be direct and instrumental
in the manner depicted by technocratic policy models’ (Russell and Williams, 2002: p.146). A more
nuanced understanding of the social character of technical change and the non-linear and complex
dynamics of innovation processes can help policy makers ‘to identify possible points of intervention’
and assess the ‘the dynamics of policy intervention’ e.g. in relation to innovation outcomes (Russell
and Williams, 2002: p.146).
A danger of course of focusing on long term socio-technical processes and speaking in terms of
system level frameworks is that the real world, day-to-day messiness of socio-technical change is
glossed over. For example the ideal type governance logics discussed in Section 3.1 – government,
market and civil society – do not exist in isolation, rather socio-technical change will be politically
negotiated, the transition pathway taken will be shaped by conﬂict and forms of alignment between
these worldviews.
Insights can be drawn here from recent contributions to the political economy of energy systems
and structural change (Kuzemko and Bradshaw, 2013; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Bradshaw, 2010).
Areas of increasing politicisation in the UK in relation to energy investment, such as rising energy
bills and contestation surrounding different technology options e.g. shale gas, nuclear power etc., are
shaped by trade-offs between long term decarbonisation goals and shorter-term objectives relating
to security of supply and affordability of energy services, which may  be perceived as more pressing
by policy makers. Elsewhere (Foxon, 2013) one of the authors has characterised this arena of conﬂict
and negotiation in terms of an ‘action space’ between government, civil society and market gover-
nance logics. Powerful actors enrol others into their worldview, alliances are formed leading to the
dominance of one logic, or the formation of hybrid pathways (Bolton and Foxon, 2013a).
More empirically grounded research could explore in more depth how ongoing actor dynamics and
political processes might inﬂuence investment decisions and the implications for long term trajectories
of socio-technical change.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we highlighted how the extant literature on socio-technical systems can be oper-
ationalised to address important questions on the role of policy in effectively mobilising ﬁnance to
achieve low carbon objectives in the UK electricity sector. In the sections above we have illustrated
a number of ways in which the basis for policy making in this area could be enhanced: ﬁrstly, by
developing long term energy scenarios for the analysis of investment risk and uncertainty which are
sensitive to actor dynamics and structural changes in the system of governance; secondly, by sensi-
tising policy interventions to the dynamics of long term transition processes in an effort to explore
options and improve the potential for innovative solutions; and, thirdly, by emphasising the need to
foster diversity and learning processes in the area of ﬁnancial innovation.
In the UK, as in other countries, new policy frameworks are required to guide the transition from
an energy governance model centred on achieving short term efﬁciencies through market operation,
to a long term approach which is resilient and adaptive in the face of new uncertainties. We have
argued that socio-technical systems frameworks, combined with empirical analysis, can provide useful
frameworks to address these types of questions and inform wider societal debates on low carbon
investment options.
R. Bolton, T.J. Foxon / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 14 (2015) 165–181 179
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the UK Engineering and Physical
Science Research Council (EPSRC) who funded the research undertaken as part of the Realising Tran-
sition Pathways consortium (EPSRC Reference: EP/K005316/1), as well as partners in that consortium
from the Universities of Bath, Cardiff, East Anglia, Loughborough, Strathclyde and Surrey, Imperial
College London and University College London. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
special section on ‘Regime Dynamics’ held at the 2013 International Conference on Sustainable Tran-
sitions in Zurich. We  would like to thank the participants at that session for their helpful comments
and feedback. Thank you to Professor Jan Webb of University of Edinburgh for her helpful comments
on an earlier version of this paper.
Appendix. List of interviewees and dates
1. Head of Sustainability at a large investment fund. 14-1-2013
2. Head of renewables policy at a major UK energy utility. 15-1-2013
3. Company secretary of an energy cooperative. 25-1-2013
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